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Summary 
Using new statistical data on financing, coverage and economic and health care 
provisions, this article analyses how sickness insurance was introduced, managed 
and extended in Spain, under the Franco dictatorship, between 1939 and 1962. This 
article highlights how the dictatorship accelerated its implementation for political 
motives and this resulted in a failure of the system due to the lack of public financing 
and the high pharmaceutical, medical and infrastructure costs.  
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In most countries in Europe, the establishment of the first state-sponsored social 
insurances in the late nineteenth century had two basic precedents: on the one hand, 
professional insurances that had already been developed on the initiative of 
employers or workers and, on the other hand, voluntary associations among workers 
through friendly societies or trade union organisations.1 These formulas emerged as 
a response to the lack of protection afforded to the poorer sections of the population 
in the nascent industrial society. In some countries (e.g. Great Britain before 1945; 
Italy, and Ireland), friendly societies ended up being integrated into the public social 
protection system, still preserving their private character in some cases, while in 
other countries (e.g. Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, and Spain) they remained 
outside the state system of coverage.2 At the beginning of the twentieth century, a 
limited group of private insurance companies was added to this panorama, but they 
had scant capital and provided limited coverage, basically in urban areas.  
                                                 
1 Friendly societies are characterised by being non-profit making voluntary associations in which the 
insured, who are at the same time insurers, act as administrators and receive aid from common funds 
in the situations of risk established in their statutes. In most cases, these societies cover the risk of 
sickness. In France they were called ‘Mutualités’, in Germany ‘Hilfskassen’ and in Spain ‘Sociedades 
de Socorro Mutuo’. 
2 The classification by groups of countries has been obtained from Marcel Van der Linden, ed, Social 
Security Mutualism. The Comparative History of Mutual Benefit Societies (Bern: Peter Lang AG, 
1996), 37 and Francisco J. Maldonado, Las Mutualidades de previsión como entidades aseguradoras 
(Granada: Comares, 2001). More information on the origin, development and role of worker solidarity 
in social coverage in David T. Beito, From Mutual Aid to the Welfare State: Fraternal Societies and 
Social Services, 1890-1967 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); Brian J. Glenn, 
‘Understanding Mutual Benefit Societies, 1860-1960’, Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, 2001, 
26, 638-51. 
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In general, during these early stages, the coverage of social risks came from 
four basic sectors with different weight according to the country: the state, the 
market, the traditional family network – less robust in urban areas – and solidarity 
among workers. The scenario depicted above represents what Bernard Harris and 
Paul Bridgen have termed the ‘mixed economy of welfare’.3These authors explain 
that the distribution of responsibilities in matters of social coverage between the 
state, the market, the family and the civil society was gradually being established in 
each country with different results. Martin Lengwiler adds that the final result would 
depend on the relative strength of these agents in the historical context of each 
country.4 As regards health coverage in the United States, John Murray has shown 
that this led to a predominance of the market of private insurers and a secondary role 
for the state.5 Meanwhile, in Europe, some countries opted for a public health care 
system and others for mixed systems where the state collaborated with mutuals in 
order to offer medical health care services.6 
                                                 
3 Bernard Harris and Paul Bridgen, eds, Charity and Mutual Aid in Europe and North America since 
1800 (Nueva York: Routledge, 2007). 
4 Martin Lengwiler, ‘Competing Appeals: The Rise of Mixed Welfare Economies in Europe, 1850-1945’ 
in Gregory Anderson, Christian Thomann and J. Matthias Graf von der Schulenburg, ed., The Appeal 
of Insurance (Toronto: University of Toronto Press), 173-200. 
5 John E. Murray, Origins of American Health Insurance. A History of Industrial Sickness Funds (New 
Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2007). 
6 For more on these aspects, see works such as Bernard Harris, The Origins of the British Welfare 
State: Society, State and Social Welfare in England and Wales 1800-1945 (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2004); K. P. Companje, R. H. M. Hendriks, K. F. E. Veraghtert and B. E. M. Widdershoven, 
Two Centuries of Solidarity. German, Belgian and Dutch social health insurance 1770-2008 
(Amsterdam: Aksant, 2009). 
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The pioneering German model of compulsory social insurances served as a 
reference and topic of discussion for other industrialised countries. However, far from 
imitating the German precedent, each country progressively established its own 
system of social coverage, reflecting its own characteristics. In this way, the 
development of social insurances was very different from country to country, both 
with respect to the number of risks covered and their management, and the real 
impact in terms coverage and provisions.7 In general terms, an analysis of the 
historiography of this topic enables us to determine two fundamental differences 
between social insurance models established prior to the Second World War: a) 
systems based on the insurance principle versus systems based on the welfare 
principle; b) compulsory insurance versus voluntary insurance. With regard to the 
latter, a process of convergence took place after the Second World War, as 
compulsory insurances were established in almost all European countries. 
The factors that explain the different rates of progress in social insurance are 
very complex. Most authors recognise that the paucity of data on the development of 
social insurances in many countries before the Second World War hinders a 
comprehensive quantitative comparison. Consequently, several authors who have 
attempted to do so have used the dates of passage of the first social insurance laws 
                                                 
7 These differences can be seen in works that attempt to make an international comparison of the 
different models. These include: Margaret S. Gordon, Social Security Policies in Industrial Countries: a 
comparative analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Douglas E. Ashford, La 
Aparición de los Estados de Bienestar (Madrid: Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, 1989); 
Gerhard A. Ritter, El Estado Social, su origen y desarrollo en una comparación internacional (Madrid: 
Centro de Publicaciones Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, 1991); Peter A. Köhler and Hans F. 
Zacher, eds, The Evolution of Social Insurance, 1881-1981. Studies of Germany, France, Great 
Britain, Austria and Switzerland (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982). 
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as a proxy variable of the development of social insurances.8 Other authors who 
have tried to use variables that are more representative of the real development of 
these insurances, utilising their coverage rate or the volume of public expenditure, 
have had to limit themselves to small samples of countries or to studying the 
particular cases of individual countries.9 
In general, from a chronological point of view, two basic stages can be 
distinguished in the process of international diffusion of social insurances according 
to the historiography. Until the First World War, insurances spread very slowly and, in 
the majority of cases, under systems of subsidised voluntary pensions known as 
‘subsidised freedom’. In this first stage, only France, Denmark and the United 
Kingdom managed to cover the four fundamental risks (industrial accidents, 
pensions, sickness and unemployment), albeit with limited coverage. Nevertheless, 
during the interwar period an accelerated development of social insurances took 
place, above all in Western European countries and some European colonies. The 
                                                 
8 See, for example, Ritter, El Estado Social; Kohler and Zacher, The Evolution of Social Insurance and 
Chikako Usui, ‘Welfare State Development in a World System context: Event History Analysis of First 
Social Insurance Legislation among 60 countries, 1880-1960’, in Thomas Janoski and Alexander M. 
Hicks, eds, The Comparative Political Economy of the Welfare State (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994), 254-77.  
9 For an example of the former, see Peter H. Lindert, Growing Public: Social Spending and Economic 
Growth since the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), and for 
particular case studies, see Paul V. Dutton, Origins of the French Welfare State. The struggle for 
social reform in France 1914-1947 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Dutton, 2002); Derek 
Fraser, The Evolution of the British Welfare State (Nueva York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); Harris, 
The Origins of British Welfare State; Martin Gorsky and Sally Sheard, eds, Financing Medicine: The 
British Experience since 1750 (London: Routledge, 2006); Jerònia Pons and Javier Silvestre, eds, Los 
orígenes del estado de bienestar en España, 1900-1945 (Zaragoza: PUZ, 2010). 
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historiography has highlighted the impact of the First World War on social demands, 
the strengthening of the labour movement and the development of democratic 
structures in many countries as the principal factors of this boom. Later, the Great 
Depression led to an increase in the responsibilities of the state. Moreover, it is also 
necessary to mention the role of international institutions such as the International 
Labour Organization (1919) and the International Social Security Association (1927) 
in the diffusion of social insurances.10 
In the core of pioneer countries, all of them European (the United Kingdom, 
Germany, Denmark and Ireland), the four basic social insurances had already been 
introduced, with a high degree of effective coverage of the population by the late 
1930s.11 On a second level, we find another group of European countries that had 
the four insurances, but which only maintained moderate levels of coverage (Norway, 
Sweden, Holland, Belgium, Italy, France, Austria, Luxembourg and Czechoslovakia). 
Other countries had, at best, incomplete systems because some social risks were not 
covered. This was the case of Spain, which had to wait until after the Spanish Civil 
War (1936-1939) to introduce compulsory sickness insurance. By then, 25 European 
                                                 
10 For more on the role of these organizations in the expansion of insurance, see also Usui, ‘Welfare 
State’. More on the controversies over private and social insurance within international organizations 
such as the International Labour Office (ILO), the International Social Security Association (ISSA) and 
the International Congress of Actuaries between 1900 and 1960 can be found in Martin Lengwiler, 
‘Competing globalizations: controversies between private and social insurance at International 
Organizations, 1900-60’, in Robin Pearson, ed, The Development of International Insurance (London: 
Pickering and Chatto, 2010), 167-86. 
11 Quantitative information on these aspects can be found in Peter Flora, State, Economy and Society 
in Western Europe, 1815-1975 (Francfort: Campus Verlag, 1983); Ashford, La aparición; Köhler and 
Zacher, The Evolution of Social Insurance. 
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countries, 6 Latin American countries, Japan and New Zealand had managed to pass 
laws providing protection against the risk of sickness.12  
This article seeks to analyse a different case from the majority of European 
countries, namely, the introduction of an insurance that was essential for the welfare 
of the population, and for the future of the Spanish social security system, in a 
dictatorial framework and in a context of economic scarcity between 1939 and 1962. 
With this aim, the relationship between the political interests of the dictatorship, the 
system of financing and management adopted and the low degree of coverage 
attained are examined. The article is divided into three parts. The first section 
concentrates on the implementation of sickness insurance during the Franco 
dictatorship. The second section analyses the degree of coverage in terms of 
population and provisions. The third section deals with the direct management of the 
insurance and the system of collaborative agreements and the development of health 
care infrastructure.  
In Spain, during the first third of the twentieth century, the first laws governing 
industrial accident insurance (1900); pensions (voluntary in 1909 and compulsory in 
1919/1921); and maternity (benefits in 1923 and insurance in 1929/1931) had been 
promulgated; and a system of subsidised freedom was introduced to cover 
unemployment in 1933.13 Within this context, sickness insurance seemed to be only 
                                                 
12 Alfonso Herranz, ‘La difusión internacional de los seguros sociales antes de 1945’, in Pons and 
Silvestre, Los orígenes, 51-84; Murray, Origins of American Health, 39-41. 
13 See the works collected in Pons and Silvestre, Los orígenes. For more on this period, see Juan I. 
Palacio Morena, La institucionalización de la reforma social en España, 1883-1924. La Comisión y el 
Instituto de Reformas Sociales (Madrid: Ministerio de Trabajo, 1988); Juan I. Palacio Morena, La 
construcción del Estado Social (Madrid: Consejo Económico y Social, 2004); Santiago Castillo, ed, 
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a matter of time. However, the Spanish government neither legislated, regulated nor 
provided financing to cover this contingency before the outbreak of the Civil War.14 
The state’s responsibility was limited to protecting the public against any abuses or 
fraud committed by the different funds or societies providing private insurance, 
whether in terms of health care provision or of an economic nature. The slow 
development of private insurance companies and the state’s inability to introduce 
compulsory sickness insurance meant that the greatest health care coverage in 
Spain during this period was the work of a cluster of friendly societies. In spite of their 
limited financial capacity, these societies helped to prevent many working-class 
families from falling victim to the vicious cycle of sickness-loss of income-poverty, 
which was most feared by the people at this time.15 
                                                                                                                                                        
Solidaridad, Seguridad, Bienestar. Cien años de protección social en España (Madrid: Ministerio de 
Trabajo e Inmigración, 2008). 
14 The state limited itself to granting ridiculous subsidies to a handful of friendly societies. See 
Margarita Vilar Rodríguez, ‘La cobertura social a través de las sociedades de socorro mutuo, 1839-
1935. ¿Una alternativa al Estado para afrontar los fallos de mercado?’, in Pons and Silvestre, Los 
orígenes, 85-122 and 113-14; Jerònia Pons Pons and Margarita Vilar Rodríguez, ‘Friendly societies, 
commercial insurance and the state in sickness risk coverage: the case of Spain (1880-1944)’, 
International Review of Social History, 2011, 56 (1), 71-101.  
15 Coverage through friendly societies basically entailed insurance against loss of income during 
periods of sickness. This philosophy was not exclusive to the Spanish case, see Marco H. D. van 
Leeuwen, ‘Historical Welfare Economics in the Nineteenth Century. Mutual Aid and Private Insurance 
for Burial, Sickness, Old Age, Widowhood, and Unemployment in the Netherlands’ in Bernard Harris 
and Paul Bridgen, eds, Charity and mutual aid in Europe and North America since 1800, (New York, 
USA: Routledge, 2007), 89-130. For more on the Spanish case, see Margarita Vilar Rodríguez and 
Jerònia Pons Pons, ‘El papel de las sociedades de socorro mutuo en la cobertura del riesgo de 
enfermedad en España (1870-1942)’ (Proceedings of the Xth International Congress of Economic 
History, The Spanish Association of Economic History, Sevilla: Universidad Pablo Olavide, 2011) 
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In the first decades of the twentieth century, there were various unsuccessful 
attempts to implement state sickness insurance. Why did the state fail when it came 
to establishing sickness insurance before the Civil War? Various factors hindered the 
introduction of the insurance. The most serious obstacles included an inefficient tax 
system, which curbed the possible increase in state income proceeding from direct 
taxes. This in turn impeded the creation of all the health care infrastructure needed to 
introduce sickness insurance for the entire population.16 On the other hand, the 
opposition continued from the majority of employers, medical associations 
andmutuals and insurance companies, who felt their private business interests to be 
at risk. Even workers showed themselves unwilling to accept an insurance based on 
contributions, as they were hoping for greater state coverage without having to pay 
contributions, as was the case with old age pensions. 
 Spanish historiography offers interesting studies on the attempts to introduce 
sickness insurance in the circumstances existing prior to the Civil War. A number of 
these studies focus on the political debate that was generated in Spain among the 
different social pressure groups linked to the implementation of health insurance 
(doctors, insurance companies, trade unions and political representatives).17 Other 
authors have concentrated on the progress of health care coverage during the period 
                                                 
16 Francisco Comín, ‘La economía española en el periodo de entreguerras (1919-1935)’, in Jordi 
Nadal, Albert Carreras and Carles Sudrià, eds, La economía española en el siglo XX. Una perspectiva 
histórica (Barcelona: Ariel, 1987), 105-49. 
17 Isabel Porras Gallo, ‘La profilaxis de las enfermedades infecciosas tras la pandemia gripal de 1818-
19: los seguros sociales’, Dynamis, 1993, 13, 279-93; Isabel Porras Gallo, ‘Un foro de debate sobre el 
seguro de enfermedad: las conferencias del Ateneo de Madrid en 1934’, Asclepio, 1999, 51, 159-84 
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of left-wing government of the Second Republic.18 Finally, some works have 
attempted to explain the obstacles that hindered the introduction of compulsory 
sickness insurance in Spain during this period.19 Likewise, the implementation of 
compulsory sickness insurance during the first stage of the Franco regime has been 
dealt with in general works on the development of social security.20 However, the 
majority of these studies have only focused on certain aspects. On the one hand, 
there are works that have concentrated on a description of the origins and 
implementation of sickness insurance.21 On the other hand, there have been 
numerous studies of the National Welfare Institute (Instituto Nacional de Previsión, or 
INP) and the struggle to control it by the different ‘families’ of the Francoist regime 
(mainly social Catholics and Falangists).22 Other works, meanwhile, have 
concentrated on the Franco regime’s changes in public health care policies.23  
                                                 
18 Josep Bernabeu Mestre, ‘La utopía reformadora de la segunda republica: la labor de Marcelino 
Pascual al frente de la Dirección General de Sanidad, 1931-1933)’, Revista Española de Salud 
Pública, 2000, 74, 1-13; Esteban Rodríguez Ocaña, ‘La asistencia médica colectiva en España hasta 
1936’, in José Álvarez Junco, ed, Historia de la Acción pública en España. Beneficencia y Previsión 
(Madrid: Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, 1990), 321-61 
19 Pons and Vilar, ‘Friendly societies’ and Vilar and Pons, ‘El papel de las sociedades’. 
20 The most recent include José L. Tortuero, ed, Cien años de protección social en España (Madrid: 
MTIN, 2007); Castillo, Solidaridad; Santiago Castillo and Rafael Ruzafa, eds, La previsión social en la 
historia (Madrid: Siglo XXI, 2009), 255- 63. 
21 Pedro González Murillo, ‘La política social del franquismo: el seguro obligatorio de enfermedad’. 
Aportes, 2005, 57, 62-76; Pedro González Murillo, ‘El franquismo social: propaganda y seguros a 
través del Instituto Nacional de Previsión (1939-1962)’, in Castillo, Solidaridad, 89-124. 
22 Arturo Álvarez Rosete, ‘¡Bienvenido, Mister Beveridge! El viaje de William Beveridge a España y la 
Previsión Social Franquista’, International Journal of Iberian Studies, 2004, 17 (2), 105-116; Arturo 
Álvarez Rosete, ‘Elaborados con calma, ejecutados con prisa. El avance de los seguros sociales y la 
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All of these studies have shed light on the context in which compulsory 
sickness insurance was prepared in the 1940s.24 Few of these studies, however, 
have focused their interest on aspects related to the management of the insurance, 
largely undertaken by collaborating bodies, or on its cost. The majority of studies 
available have not included any in-depth analysis of the financing of compulsory 
sickness insurance, nor of the problems caused by the application of the plan for 
health care facilities. This plan was intended to create the infrastructures necessary 
to implement the insurance, but its problems intensified when medical and surgical 
specialities were incorporated. With regard to funding, it should be emphasised that 
during approximately the first ten years of compulsory sickness insurance the state 
played no part in its financing, which came almost entirely from the premiums paid by 
employers and workers, with, of course, a greater burden in reality for the workers at 
a time of a reduction in real wages and significant inflation.25 
                                                                                                                                                        
evolución del Instituto Nacional de Previsión en España entre 1836 y 1950’, in Castillo and Ruzafa, La 
previsión social, 255-263; Emilio Majuelo, ‘Falangistas y católicos-sociales en liza por el control de las 
cooperativas’, Historia del Presente, 2004, 3, 29-43. 
23 Esteban Rodríguez Ocaña, ‘The politics of public health in the state-managed scheme of healthcare 
in Spain (1940-1990)’, in Ilana Löwy and John Krige, eds, Images of Disease. Science, Public Policy 
and Health in Post-war Europe (Luxembourg: European Communities, 2001), 187-210. 
24 The main statistical source for this article is the information stored in the INGESA archive. This 
archive contains documentation of the bodies responsible for health care management in Spain during 
the period under study. The quantitative and qualitative information has been supplemented with other 
reports and periodicals of the time. 
25 In both in agriculture and industry, real wages slumped over an extended period of time after the 
Civil War. See Margarita Vilar Rodríguez, Los salarios del miedo. Mercado de trabajo y crecimiento 
económico en España durante el franquismo (Santiago de Compostela: Fundación 10 de Marzo, 
2009). 
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The implementation of compulsory sickness insurance (1939-1944) 
The serious health care crisis of the Spanish postwar period alarmed the Francoist 
authorities for two basic reasons.26 On the one hand, the catastrophic situation could 
put the country’s public health at risk, which would tarnish the image of the victorious 
Francoist ‘New State’. On the other hand, the health care crisis could threaten both 
the desired ‘social peace’ and the process of winning over the masses. Within this 
context, the Franco dictatorship used sickness insurance to legitimise its power, win 
the support of the masses and serve as a purveyor of propaganda to transmit its 
social concern. The social insurance system introduced under Franco had much in 
common with those functioning under the dictatorial regimes in Germany and Italy. 
The case of sickness insurance is a clear example of this proximity. The dictatorship 
in Spain adapted the comprehensive sickness insurance model in force in Nazi 
Germany, which was an insurance of the Bismarckian tradition, but strictly controlled 
by the state. Yet it also drew inspiration from the system of organisation prevalent in 
Italy. In other words, it was a system where a number of party-controlled agencies 
and institutions shared responsibility for its management. The result was a low level 
of coverage among the population and inadequate health care provisions.27  
                                                 
26 The infant mortality rate was 115.3 per thousand in 1935 and 148.6 per thousand in 1941, see 
Roser Nicolau, ‘Población, salud y actividad’, in Albert Carreras and Xavier Tafunell, eds, Estadísticas 
Históricas de España. Siglos XIX y XX (Madrid: Fundación BBVA, 2005), 79-154, 131. On the other 
hand, deaths from disease were obtained from the Anuario Estadístico de España, 1955, 751. For 
more detail on these aspects, see Jerònia Pons Pons and Margarita Vilar Rodríguez, ‘Labour 
repression and social justice in Franco’s Spain: the political objectives of compulsory sickness 
insurance (1942-1957)’, Labor History, 2012, 53 (2), 245–67. 
27 Eric Owen Smith, The German Economy (London: Routledge, 1994) and Vera Zamagni, The 
Economic History of Italy, 1860–1990 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). 
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The basic principles of the labour and social policy of the Franco dictatorship 
were clearly established during the first months of the Spanish Civil War (1936-
1939). Immediately, all political and trade union activity was banned, trade union 
organisations and political parties were dissolved and their properties seized.28 
Before the conflict had ended, the so-called ‘Fuero del Trabajo’ or ‘Employment 
Code’ (1938) laid down the guidelines for the functioning of the labour market which 
were to be in force during almost forty years of dictatorship. We can highlight three 
basic traits that characterise the system that was set up. First, the ‘Fuero’ designated 
the state as the supreme advisory body charged with the responsibility of 
establishing the basic rules of labour relations. The principal codes of conduct 
governing these relations centred on the duty of employers to take care of and 
protect their workers who, for their part, were expected to reciprocate with loyalty, 
discipline and subordination. Second, the legal framework was aimed at expelling 
married women from the labour market, while at the same time advocating a 
patriarchal family model where the man would have the responsibility of ‘being the 
breadwinner’.29 Finally, the ‘Fuero’ established the grouping of employers and 
workers within a single vertical ‘trade union’ (sindicato vertical) at the service of the 
state under the principles of ‘unity, totality and hierarchy’. This trade union structure 
had three main aims: to serve as an instrument of the state to help implement its 
                                                 
28 Decree of 25 September 1936, BOE (Boletín Oficial del Estado or Official State Gazette) of 28 
September 1936. Order of 10 January 1937, BOE of 11 January 1937 and Decree of 19 April 1937, 
BOE of 20 April 1937. 
29 Carmen Sarasúa and Lina Gálvez, eds., ¿Privilegios o eficiencia? Mujeres y hombres en los 
mercados de trabajo (San Vicente de Raspeig: Publicaciones de la Universidad de Alicante, 2003), 
39. Although, in practice, economic necessity forced women to continue working in secrecy without 
guarantees or labour rights. 
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economic policy, to do away with the class struggle and to impose a framework of 
discipline and control of the productive forces.30 Although the vertical trade union 
performed an important function in the dictatorship’s repressive machinery, effective 
control over many of the workers was exercised directly by employers from within 
their own companies. This legal scenario completely destroyed the capacity of wage 
earners either to protest or to negotiate, while at the same time it made labour 
conditions tougher and reduced workers’ purchasing power. The initial investment in 
terror brought the dictatorship great dividends in the long term, in terms of consent 
and control.31 
With this background, the elaboration of the legal bases of the insurance and 
its implementing regulation was carried out amidst confrontations over the control of 
the National Welfare Institute. In the first stage, after its reconstitution in 22 August 
1938, the Institute was under social-Catholic influence with a leading role of former 
members such as Luis Jordana de Pozas. However, from 1941 until mid-1945 (when 
fascism was defeated in a large part of Europe) there was a strong Falangist 
influence with the arrival of Minister Girón at the Ministry of Labour (1941-1957).32 
The Falange - the only official and legal political party during the dictatorship - 
                                                 
30 The law of 26 January 1940 on union unification (‘Ley de Unidad Sindical’, BOE of 31 January 
1940) converted the FET y JONS into the only organisations authorised to channel labour conflict. 
31 Paul Preston, Caudillo de España (Barcelona: Grijalbo, 1994), 971. The law on state security of 29 
March 1941 (BOE of 11 April 1941) also contributed its dose of terror by punishing subversive and 
anti-patriotic behavior with the death penalty. 
32 For this period, see Pedro González Murillo, ‘El mutualismo laboral como expresión del fracaso en 
la implantación de los seguros sociales’, in E. Baena and F. J. Fernández, eds, Tercer Encuentro de 
Investigadores sobre el Franquismo y la Transición (Sevilla: Muñoz Moya editor, 1988), 329-37; 
Carme Molinero, La captación de las masas. Política social y propaganda en el régimen franquista 
(Madrid: Cátedra, 2005); Majuelo, ‘Falangistas’; Álvarez Rosete, ‘Elaborados con calma’. 
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promoted the compulsory sickness insurance (Seguro Obligatorio de Enfermedad, or 
SOE), passed by the Law of 14 December 1942, as something of their own, 
excluding the National Public Health Department - in the hands of Catholic and 
monarchist military circles - which was left to run preventative campaigns, including 
the fight against tuberculosis. The power struggles between the different factions of 
the Franco regime, in which the Falangists initially prevailed, determined the success 
of some health care projects, such as the approval of the Silicosis Scheme (1941), or 
the failure of others, for example such as the tuberculosis insurance programme.33 
On 25 July 1941, just a few days after taking charge of the Ministry of Labour, 
José A. Girón de Velasco signed a decree creating a commission responsible for 
drawing up a preliminary draft law for compulsory sickness insurance.34 The 
commission comprised the Director-General for Welfare, three directors of the 
National Welfare Institute, one of whom would be a representative of the National 
Syndicalist Federation, the Commissioner of the National Welfare Institute, and 
representatives of the National Public Health Department, the National Anti-
tuberculosis Board, the General Council of Medical Colleges and the ‘Obra 18 de 
Julio’ – an organisation linked to the Falangist union.35 The commission also included 
                                                 
33 The Law of 14 December 1942 was published in the BOE of 27 December 1942. Jorge Molero 
Mesa, ‘Enfermedad y previsión social en España durante el primer franquismo (1936-1951). El 
frustrado seguro obligatorio contra la tuberculosis’, Dynamis, 1994, 14, 199-225; Alfredo Menéndez-
Navarro, 'The politics of silicosis in interwar Spain: Republican and Francoist approaches to 
occupational health', Dynamis, 2008; 28, 77-102; Álvarez Rosete, ‘Mister Beveridge’. 
34 Decree of 11 June 1941. BOE of 12 July 1941, 5587. 
35 The National-Syndicalist conception of health care led the National Labour Delegation (Delegación 
Nacional de Sindicatos) to create, on 9 October 1940, the so-called Obra Sindical 18 de Julio, as the 
organisation responsible for developing the social aspect of health care policy. The Obra Sindical 18 
 16
the National Welfare Institute’s actuary, a doctor from the National Fund for Industrial 
Accidents and the chief physician of the National Welfare Institute’s maternity and 
child foundation, the ‘Obra Maternal e Infantil’. The commission drew up a 
preliminary draft law for the insurance over a period of two years and transferred it to 
the Council of State, where it was approved on 11 November 1943.  
The commission met for the first time at the National Welfare Institute 
headquarters on 1 August (1941) and, after a pondered study, presented the 
preliminary draft law to the Minister on 4 May 1942. The preliminary draft law 
determined the risks to be covered by the proposed sickness insurance; its structure, 
economic provisions, indemnities and health care provisions, as well as the 
resources required and the viability of its management. Subsequently, a new special 
commission constituted by an Order of 28 October 1942 revised the preliminary draft 
law, introduced slight modifications and considered its mission accomplished in early 
December.36 Shortly afterwards, the law of 14 December 1942 was published, 
creating compulsory sickness insurance, and the National Welfare Institute was given 
a period of six months to draw up the regulation of the law.37 The Institute fulfilled the 
mandate within the deadline. In July 1943, while Europe was embroiled in the 
Second World War, a National Welfare Institute delegation went abroad with the aim 
of studying the administrative organisation of sickness insurance in countries that 
                                                                                                                                                        
de Julio initially channelled its activities into three major sections: general health care, medical 
assistance and occupational health care. In this initial period, the Obra Sindical 18 de Julio fulfilled two 
important functions: implementing the health care and social policy of the National Movement and the 
provision of medical and pharmaceutical care to low-income workers. 
36 The characteristics of this commission can be consulted in the BOE of 6 November 1942, 9005. 
37 The law creating compulsory sickness insurance was published in the BOE of 27 December 1942, 
10592-97. 
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had already implemented it. During their trip they visited Germany and other 
countries under Axis influence such as the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, 
Austria, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria, returning to Spain in September. 
The information gained allowed the draft regulation of compulsory sickness insurance 
to be completed before its transfer to the Council of State, where it was approved on 
11 November 1943.38 
Shortly after the passage of the regulation, in December 1943, the National 
Sickness Insurance Fund (Caja Nacional del Seguro de Enfermedad) was created 
with the initial task of organising its work and outlining its administrative procedure 
over the next five months. The affiliation process was initiated in May 1944, and in 
September of the same year entitlement to receive benefits came into force.39 
Compulsory sickness insurance was the responsibility of the National Welfare 
Institute, as the sole insurer. Nevertheless, companies could choose whether their 
staff received the medical services provided under the insurance through the Obra 18 
de Julio or, always under direct agreement with the National Welfare Institute, 
through state, provincial, municipal or private institutions. In the latter case, a 
favourable (ideological) report by the aforementioned Obra was required.40  
The implementation of compulsory sickness insurance had to overcome serious 
obstacles, which compelled its progressive introduction in two stages.41 During the 
                                                 
38 The regulation of the law on compulsory sickness insurance was published in the BOE of 28 
November 1943, 11427-36. 
39 Boletín de Información del Instituto Nacional de Previsión (BIINP), 1945 (1), 21-29. 
40 BOE of 27 December 1942, 10594 and BOE of 1 July 1944, 5112-13. 
41 Compulsory sickness insurance regulation, BOE of 18 November 1943, 11436. As a result, the 
sickness insurance emerged as a means of providing access to health care through the provision of 
diverse medical and pharmaceutical services and not merely as a form of income protection.  
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first years only domiciliary care would come into effect, and later, specialist care and 
hospital services. Thus, general medical care and pharmaceutical treatment would 
be provided when the insurance first came into force, for a maximum period of 26 
weeks a year for the insured and 13 for their family members.42 Specialities and 
hospital services were scheduled to become operational after a period of two years, 
although in the end they were not incorporated until 1947-1948. Specialist medical 
care and hospital services were then offered to insured and families up to a limit of 
12 and 6 weeks respectively. The main obstacles to the introduction of compulsory 
sickness insurance were inadequate infrastructure, the financial requirements and 
the need to win over pressure groups that were historically opposed to this 
insurance.  
In fact, the first step to be taken was to organise medical and pharmaceutical 
services, overcoming the reticence that these professional groups felt towards the 
public health care service. The problem of winning support for the introduction of 
compulsory health insurance among doctors, who feared a drop in their professional 
income, was successfully dealt with by inviting representatives of the medical 
profession to collaborate in preparing the legislation, to a massive offer of public 
employment and to higher medical fees. According to what can be deduced from the 
information provided by Sebastián Criado del Rey, director of the National Sickness 
Insurance Fund in 1947, representatives of the medical profession were invited to 
participate in the drafting committee of the bill (7 of the 14 members were doctors), in 
the commission of the draft regulation (10 of the 26 members were doctors, and 
another 3 were pharmacists) and in the liaison committee of article 28 of the law of 
                                                 
42 BIINP, 1944 (11), 1396-98. 
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1942 (9 of the 14 members were doctors and 1 was a pharmacist), all of which dealt 
with matters relating to the appointment of doctors, family quotas and fees. 
Meanwhile, a system of authorisation was created for doctors to attend those 
insured under compulsory sickness insurance, based on making a limited number of 
doctors public employees. Efforts were made to incorporate doctors in rural areas 
into the insurance, and also some doctors working in private medicine. Later, doctors 
from the Falangist organisation Obra 18 de Julio and the National Welfare Institute’s 
Obra Maternal e Infantil were also included. The initial estimate was that 16,000 
doctors would be incorporated into the scheme, whose annual salaries would be, 
according to the National Welfare Institute’s own figures, between 20,000 and 22,500 
pesetas for doctors with 500 families (upper limit) and 15,750 pesetas for doctors 
with 350 families, higher than those offered by other state bodies or under the so-
called system of ‘igualas’.43 As regards pharmacists, an agreement was signed 
between the council of the National Welfare Institute and the General Council of 
Pharmaceutical Associations regulating the provision of pharmaceutical services 
under compulsory sickness insurance. The insurance took responsibility for all 
pharmaceutical provisions and pharmacies were obliged to dispense all prescriptions 
issued by the doctors of the compulsory insurance scheme.44  
                                                 
43 In rural areas, some doctors, besides taking responsibility for the medical care of those included in 
the census of the poor, also offered private cover to the rest of the population in return for payment by 
means of a system of agreed retainer fees (known as ‘igualas’). This service, however, did not include 
any pecuniary compensation and lacked the provision of services in medical-surgical specialities. See 
Pons and Vilar, ‘Friendly societies’; Sebastián Criado del Rey, Problemas sanitarios del seguro de 
enfermedad (Madrid: INP, 1947), 28-32. See also the Order of 16 May 1944, BOE of 22 May 1944, 
4010 and the Order of 26 June 1944, BOE of 28 June 1944, 5027. 
44 Decree of 11 November 1943. BOE of 18 September 1943, 11430 and BIINP, 1944, 10, 1318. 
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Second, applying the compulsory sickness insurance required a great 
economic investment, as its functioning demanded substantial expenditure on 
infrastructure and human and material resources. Compulsory sickness insurance, 
therefore, the cornerstone of the Franco regime’s social policy propaganda, was 
faced with enormous problems due to the state’s lack of resources, a result of the 
postwar economic crisis, autarky and the regressive tax system. The lack of 
resources conditioned both the management of the scheme and the required health 
care infrastructure. Agreements signed with private entities, which used their own 
human resources and health care infrastructure, were crucial in overcoming these 
obstacles.45 It must be borne in mind that compulsory sickness insurance was set up 
under a general pay-as-you-go system, which meant that it covered provisions with 
the premiums collected that same year.46  
The financial problem was overcome during the first ten years with funds from 
other insurances, which supplied a start-up capital of 50 million pesetas and a 
system of contributions in which employers and workers paid a premium for 
insurance coverage, with practically no contribution whatsoever from the state (Table 
1).47 By an order of 3 June 1944, a premium was fixed equivalent to 5.013 percent of 
earned income, to be paid equally between employers and workers – although 
                                                 
45 Decree of 2 March 1944 and BIINP, 1945, 1, 29. 
46 ‘Características del Seguro español de enfermedad’, Speech delivered by the Commissioner of the 
National Welfare Institute, Luis Jordana de Pozas to the Círculo de la Unión Mercantil de Madrid on 20 
May 1944, BIINP, 1944, 5, 619. 
47 The start-up capital was obtained proportionally out of the surpluses of the different insurances in 
effect in Spain on 31 December 1942. The loans were made in cash and, although they were interest 
free, they had to be repaid within ten years of the third year of implementation of compulsory sickness 
insurance. BIINP, 1944, 6, 853. 
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proportionally a greater burden for the latter – which in practice constituted the main 
source of financing for compulsory sickness insurance (Table 2). Of the total 
proceeding from the contributions of workers and employers, 2.45362 percent was 
then deducted to contribute towards the inspection of health services.  
INSERT TABLES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
The rush – due to the political objectives of the insurance – also obliged the 
creation of some limits in terms of membership. In the first stage of the insurance, 
compulsory registration was only established for all employees over the age of 14 
(the minimum age for employment at that time) whose earned income did not exceed 
a very limited amount: 9,000 pesetas/year. This limit was raised to 12,000 pesetas in 
1948 and 18,000 pesetas in 1949.48 Workers with earnings over the established 
limits lost the condition of compulsorily insured, but could join or continue with the 
insurance as voluntarily insured by paying the full premium. The income limit was not 
the only entry barrier to the benefits of compulsory sickness insurance, as some 
groups of workers were only incorporated later. This was the case of casual workers, 
home workers, seamen or agricultural workers, who had social insurance under their 
own special schemes.49 
 
Membership, coverage and management of compulsory sickness insurance 
(1939-1962) 
                                                 
48 Amount in current pesetas. Compulsory sickness insurance regulation, BOE of 28 September 1943. 
Joaquín García Murcia and M. Antonia Castro Argüelles, eds, Legislación Histórica de Previsión 
Social (Pamplona: Aranzadi-Gobierno del Principado de Asturias, 2009), 185. For the increases in 
wage limits, see the Order of 9 March 1948 and the Decree of 1 July 1949.  
49 Decree of 29 April 1959 and Decree of 2 March 1961, BOE of 14 March 1961. 
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The law of 1942 assigned the role of introducing, managing and administrating the 
insurance to the National Welfare Institute and the organisation of medical services 
to the Obra 18 de Julio. However, in 1944, the Institute had neither sufficient staff to 
cope with the bureaucratic aspects of management nor enough health care centres. 
In 1944 there were 353 centres (clinics and outpatient centres) available for 
compulsory sickness insurance. These belonged to the National Welfare Institute, the 
National Public Health Department, the Obra Maternal e Infantil and there were also 
industrial accident clinics, but the insurance lacked its own centres.50 In view of this 
situation, a decree was issued on 2 March 1944, which created a system of 
collaboration with private entities for managing compulsory sickness insurance. 
Nominally, the insurance remained in the hands of the National Welfare Institute, but 
in reality the National Sickness Insurance Fund was authorised to delegate its 
managerial powers to private entities which, if they met certain requirements, could 
be designated collaborating bodies. By January 1945, 180 special agreements had 
been signed, corresponding to 120 mutual societies, 6 ‘montepíos’ (similar to friendly 
societies), 12 ‘igualatorios’ (doctors’ associations), 8 commercial companies, 32 
company funds and 2 federations.51 With regard to direct insurance, this was covered 
by medical services operating through the Obra 18 de Julio. In addition, the National 
Sickness Insurance Fund signed an agreement with the National Labour Delegation 
by which the former benefited from the network of correspondents of the union 
                                                 
50 Instituto Nacional de Previsión, El seguro de Enfermedad y sus problemas: estudio para un plan 
general de instalaciones de asistencia médica (Madrid: Ministerio de Trabajo, 1944). 
51 BIINP, 1945, 2. 
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welfare organisation ‘Obra Sindical de Previsión’, which had a wide diffusion in rural 
areas.52 
 In the decree of 2 March, the implementing rules were established for the 
special agreement between the National Welfare Institute and the private entities. 
The collaborating bodies had to pay a deposit, take responsibility for the quarterly 
collection of premiums (from workers and employers) and, after deducting benefits 
and administration costs, pay the surplus into the National Fund. The collaborating 
bodies were obliged to allocate part of the premiums collected to the following items: 
a) administration costs; b) inspection of health services; c) reserve requirements; and 
d) Health Care Facilities Plan. Furthermore, the administration costs of collaborating 
bodies operating on a national scale were initially set at 25 per cent of the amount 
collected, a figure that dropped to 20 per cent in 1947 and to 16.20 per cent in 
1948.53 Likewise, statutory reserves were established that could not exceed 10 per 
cent of premiums. Between 1947 and 1950 these reserves were set at 5 per cent. 
 The main collaborating bodies included welfare mutuals, employers’ industrial 
accident mutuals, a smaller number of medical ‘igualatorios’ and some company 
funds. The role of the employers’ mutuals, in particular, should be emphasised. They 
had been created in Spain from 1900 onwards to cover industrial accidents.54 They 
had opened dispensaries and clinics to attend to workers who had suffered an 
accident and these could be exploited for sickness coverage. However, few friendly 
societies or welfare mutuals were able to participate in these agreements after the 
                                                 
52 BIINP, 1945, 1, 21-29. 
53 BOE of 13 January 1947, BOE of 11 January 1948 and BOE of 3 February 1948. 
54 For the role of employers’ industrial accident mutuals in the management of compulsory sickness 
insurance, see Jerònia Pons Pons, ‘El seguro obligatorio de enfermedad y la gestión de las entidades 
colaboradores (1942-1963)’, Revista de la historia de la economía y de la empresa, 2010, 4, 227-48. 
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law on mutual societies of 1941, due to the need to pay a deposit and the limited 
health care infrastructure they had managed to create. 
 The agreements were signed in 1945 for a period of ten years. An analysis of 
membership during this first decade of their implementation reveals an even 
distribution of affiliated companies between direct insurance and collaborating bodies 
(Table 3). Yet if the insured and the beneficiaries are examined, it is evident that the 
collaborating bodies achieved approximately 75 per cent of coverage. This would 
therefore suggest that the companies covered by direct insurance (that is, the 
National Fund and union services) were smaller, with fewer workers, and that these 
in turn had smaller families. The number of companies covered by direct insurance 
increased over time until it reached 60 per cent of the total, while the proportion of 
insured and beneficiaries grew to 40 per cent.  
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
Four months after its implementation, in December 1944, only one quarter of 
the Spanish population was beneficiary of the compulsory sickness insurance. The 
percentage of coverage against sickness grew slowly in the following decade until it 
reached 35 per cent of the population by 1957. In this respect, the fact that 
compulsory membership only existed for permanent industrial workers in the first 
stage must be taken into account. This meant that almost 50 per cent of Spain’s 
active population, who were still engaged in agriculture in 1950, were left 
unprotected, among others.55 For all practical purposes, the situation did not begin to 
change until the creation of the national agricultural security service, the Servicio 
                                                 
55 In 1950 agricultural workers accounted for 47.6% of Spain’s total working population. Details in 
Nicolau, ‘Población’, 150. 
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Nacional de Seguridad Agraria, in 1958 and a national mutual society for agricultural 
insurance, the Mutualidad Nacional de Previsión Agraria, in 1959.56. 
Eighty per cent of the workers affiliated to compulsory sickness insurance 
were men, which is hardly surprising in a context of employment discrimination 
against married women.57 The distribution of members of the insurance scheme was 
also unequal in demographic terms. The more industrialised provinces logically had a 
higher coverage rate.58 
To extend the insurance, the National Welfare Institute used the media 
influence of the dictatorship’s single official trade union, which acted as an 
improvised insurance agent in a situation where joining the union was mandatory for 
the majority of workers. Furthermore, the National Welfare Institute put pressure on 
the members of other insurance schemes to persuade them to choose the National 
Fund.59 For their part, the collaborating bodies tried to use their own marketing 
resources efficiently. However, insurance agents were prohibited from receiving 
commission for the contracting of compulsory sickness insurance. Various factors 
can explain the collaborating bodies’ higher levels of membership (Table 4): a) the 
risk selection policy of some of the collaborating bodies, which were able to reject 
certain companies (the National Fund had to accept all applicants), while attempting 
to recruit members with a smaller number of beneficiaries and with higher wages;60 
                                                 
56 González Murillo, ‘Franquismo social’, 97-98. 
57 For more on these aspects, see Vilar, Salarios del miedo, and the bibliography given there. 
58 Instituto Nacional de Previsión, Servicio de Prestaciones Sanitarias. Informe sobre la explotación de 
las instalaciones sanitarias del seguro de enfermedad (Madrid: INP, 1959). 
59 Archivo General de la Administración, Sindicatos, Caja 13/R-349. 
60 Instituto Nacional de Previsión, Caja Nacional del Seguro de Enfermedad. Prestaciones (Madrid: 
INP, 1950). 
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b) employers preferred their own institutions where, especially in the case of larger 
companies, they had more influence on the board of directors; and c) influence over 
doctors and, therefore, control over sick workers could be exercised more directly in 
the collaborating bodies. 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 The total cost of the provision of compulsory sickness insurance was 
distributed between direct insurance and the collaborating bodies in the same 
proportion as the number of insured and beneficiaries. Direct insurance paid 
approximately 25 per cent of provisions compared with almost 75 per cent paid by 
collaborating bodies (Table 4). Between 1946 and 1952, the greatest expenditure 
was on health care provision. Both in direct insurance and in the collaborating 
bodies, economic benefits never exceeded 19 per cent and over time they showed a 
declining trend with respect to health care provisions. 
 
The increase in the cost of the insurance and the appearance of a deficit 
During the first years of the introduction of this mixed management model for 
compulsory sickness insurance the cost of the insurance increased. This rise was the 
result of the increase in items related to health expenditure, caused by the extension 
of coverage and the increase in medical fees due to hiring specialists, surgeons and 
health care assistants in order to offer medical specialities and provide hospital care, 
as well as the growth in pharmaceutical consumption resulting from the 
dissemination of new medicines and the fact that these were free. The largest health 
expenditure items were paying the fees of medical and health care staff (Tables 5 
and 6). In 1946, this segment accounted for 51.75 per cent of expenditure in direct 
insurance and 52.9 per cent for the collaborating bodies. That same year, 
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pharmaceutical costs accounted for 35.27 per cent and 36.13 per cent respectively, 
and hospital expenses 2.9 per cent in direct insurance and 0.6 per cent for the 
collaborating bodies. This difference was possibly due to the lack of state hospital 
infrastructure available for the provision of sickness insurance, which led to the need 
to resort to special agreements, with the consequent increase in costs. The most 
outstanding aspect, however, was the increase in pharmaceutical costs, which 
caused serious problems for the provision of compulsory sickness insurance in the 
medium term. In 1952, pharmaceutical costs were approaching 50 per cent of 
sickness insurance provisions both in direct insurance and in the agreements with 
collaborating bodies. The tremendous growth in pharmaceutical costs was due to the 
fact that benefits covered the full cost of medical prescriptions, and to the 
consumption of new medicines such as antibiotics. Furthermore, abuse and fraud in 
the issuing of prescriptions further increased expenses.  
INSERT TABLES 5 AND 6 ABOUT HERE 
 The extension of compulsory sickness insurance provisions was undertaken in 
different stages. In the first, which lasted until January 1947, coverage was limited to 
family medicine. The second stage was initiated with a decree of 29 December 1946, 
which extended provisions to general surgery and surgical hospitalisation, 
ophthalmological, otorhinolaryngologic and radiological care and clinical analysis as 
a diagnostic tool. The service of doctors’ assistants known as ‘practicantes’ was also 
included. Later, by an order of 28 July 1951, thoracic surgery and cardiovascular 
specialities were created. One year later, on 21 June 1952, other branches of 
surgery were included, such as the fields of urology, otorhinolaryngology, 
traumatology and orthopaedics, as well as general surgery and radiotherapy 
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services. In the same year the night-time emergency service was established and 
medical care was about to be extended to Sundays and public holidays.61 
 The plans for extending compulsory sickness insurance and the levels of 
coverage of the insurance were tied to the development of the health care 
infrastructure based on outpatient clinics (known as ‘ambulatorios’) and large 
hospitals (known as ‘residencias sanitarias’). The National Health Care Facilities Plan 
was passed by means of an order of 19 January 1945. The initial plan envisaged 86 
large hospitals with a total of 24,000 beds, 149 large outpatient clinics, 110 smaller 
outpatient clinics and 73 maternity institutions. The development phase was to last 
10 years and had a budget of 1,000 million pesetas. Just one year later the plan had 
to be revised with estimates more in line with the economic reality of the country. The 
number of large hospitals projected was reduced to 68 and large outpatient clinics to 
62, while the number of smaller outpatient clinics was increased to 144. The 
maternity institutions contemplated in the initial plan disappeared and they were 
integrated into hospitals except for one in Madrid. In 1953, after the plan had been in 
force for almost a decade, there were only nine large hospitals up and running: in La 
Coruña, Guadalajara, Valencia, Puertollano, Calatayud, Logroño, Santa Cruz de 
Tenerife, Teruel and Huelva, and 18 outpatient clinics. In May 1954, another nine 
were under construction, a figure that was a far cry from the 68 large hospitals 
originally envisaged.62 The construction of outpatient clinics and hospitals in this first 
                                                 
61 For example, for the case of Madrid, see ‘Los nuevos servicios del Seguro de Enfermedad’, Revista 
del Seguro de Enfermedad, 1952, 1 (9), 3-4. 
62 This building work was in the hands of just a few companies in the sector. The most important 
included: Eguinoa Hermanos; R. Beamonte; Agromán y Huarte y cía. See ‘Situación de las obras del 
Plan Nacional de Instalaciones del Seguro de Enfermedad, en fin de mayo de 1954’, Revista 
Española del Seguro de Enfermedad, 1954, 2 (4), 47-48. 
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decade was jointly financed by employers and workers. From 9 January 1947, 
managers of compulsory sickness insurance were obliged to pay 1.5748 per cent of 
premiums collected into the National Sickness Insurance Fund, a percentage that 
was virtually doubled to 3.125 per cent by an order of 23 January 1948.  
The Health Care Facilities Plan was developed slowly due to the lack of public 
financing and the financial dependence on the income from premiums paid by 
employers and workers. These contributions were clearly insufficient, so the 
government passed a decree on 11 January 1952 authorising the National Welfare 
Institute to issue bonds in order to meet the needs of the health care facilities 
planned for compulsory sickness insurance.63 The number of beds was increased, 
above all from 1954 onwards, when the first large hospitals to be completed started 
functioning (Table 7). The number of beds available under the plan increased from 
2,619 in 1954 to 5,713 in 1955. There was a further increase in 1956 with 8,144 
beds, and the number stabilised at 8,952 in 1957 and 1958. The greater supply of 
hospital services increased the number of hospital stays among the insured, which 
ended up affecting the cost of compulsory sickness insurance provisions. By 1957, 
there were a total of 13,000 beds available for compulsory sickness insurance (of 
these, 3,564 were beds in clinics belonging to collaborating bodies). This was still a 
far cry from the 17,000 newly-created beds envisaged by the National Health Care 
Facilities Plan in 1947.64 Despite the fact that the number of beds increased, these 
were poorly distributed geographically, as hospital infrastructures had not been built 
in the areas where the need for beds was most acute. This was due to the fact that 
                                                 
63 BOE of 16 February 1952. 
64 Instituto Nacional de Previsión, Servicio de Prestaciones. 
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the construction of these infrastructures responded more to political interests than to 
health care requirements. 
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
In 1955, the mixed management system, based on financing that was 
supported almost exclusively by workers’ and employers’ contributions, was in a 
deficit situation. The collaborating bodies had experienced difficulties after the first 
years of management. The problems were the result of various factors: a) the 
increase in expenses due to the extension of the insurance; b) the reduction in the 
percentage of premiums that could be allocated to administration costs;65 c) the 
complex bureaucratic system established by the National Fund; and d) the debts 
incurred with the National Welfare Institute with regard to the Health Care Facilities 
Plan and the Inspection of Health Services. The collaborating bodies, unlike direct 
insurance, and due to the conditions inherent in the special agreements, could not 
show a deficit in their annual accounts, and therefore had to assume the deficit 
themselves. By 1953, the financial situation of compulsory sickness insurance had 
become critical for both direct and private management. In the case of direct 
insurance, the average premium per insured had risen from 7.39 in 1944 to 41.46 in 
                                                 
65 Between 1946 and 1948, the percentage of the premium that the collaborating bodies operating on 
a national scale could allocate to administration costs fell from 25 to 16.2 per cent. In particular, the 
government determined what percentage of the premium could be retained by the collaborating 
bodies. This percentage was set according to the geographical scope of the collaborating insurance 
provider. It was not so much the result of an actuarial calculation as a political one. After the private 
management of sickness insurance had been operating for a while, the government tended to lower 
this percentage because many voices considered that this administration should not be profit making. 
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1951 (in current pesetas). The cost of provisions per insured family, however, had 
increased from 1.94 to 43.25 pesetas.66  
Generally speaking, it appears that the causes of the deficit were the increase 
in pharmaceutical costs and doctors’ fees, the financing of the Health Care Facilities 
Plan and the management of the collaborating bodies, which were accused of putting 
their commercial interests first. In 1949 a financial adjustment was introduced based 
on three measures: increasing premiums by 1 per cent, extending the insurance up 
to a wage limit of 18,000 current pesetas and establishing a new system of 
proportional contributions. However, in spite of this adjustment, the measures did not 
reverse the trend and the financial imbalance continued to grow. In 1954, when the 
first special agreements came to an end, the population of beneficiaries was 
restricted and efforts were made to persuade the collaborating bodies to participate 
in the upkeep of public hospitals and outpatient clinics. Under these circumstances, 
the principal collaborating body, Mutua General de Seguros, decided to renew the 
agreement, but in much worse conditions than the 1945 agreement. It had to pay a 
deposit of 14.1 million pesetas (10 per cent of premiums) and, while it could continue 
charging 9 per cent of wages as a contribution, the percentage of administration 
costs fell to 13 per cent. Furthermore, it was still not allowed to publish balance 
sheets showing a deficit, and it declared a debt to the National Welfare Institute of 
52.7 million pesetas.67 The second most important collaborating body, Mapfre, for its 
                                                 
66 Instituto Nacional de Previsión, I Asamblea General del Instituto Nacional de Previsión, Sección III. 
Diversos problemas actuales del Seguro de Enfermedad y de su Plan Nacional de Instalaciones 
(Madrid: INP, 1953), 20. 
67 Pons Pons, ‘Seguro obligatorio’. 
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part, decided not to renew, as management of compulsory sickness insurance had 
already caused losses of 26 million pesetas.68 
INSERT TABLES 8 AND 9 ABOUT HERE 
The direct insurance managed by the National Welfare Institute had a balance 
sheet showing losses in 1954 and 1955 (Table 8). In 1954 these losses were 26 
million pesetas, a figure that almost tripled in 1955, when the deficit of compulsory 
sickness insurance reached 74 million. In the next two years the insurance needed a 
financial injection of 220 million and 64 million pesetas respectively, money that 
came from other social insurances. For its part, the state was compelled to increase 
its contribution, although its transfers to compulsory sickness insurance were limited 
to 21 and 27 million pesetas in 1954 and 1955. Nevertheless, the enormous deficit in 
the latter year forced the state to make a greater financial effort with a contribution of 
390 million pesetas in 1956, which enabled the deficit to be eliminated. The 
collaborating bodies also had to receive an important state contribution in 1956 
(Table 9). This situation clearly demonstrated that the financing model based mainly 
on workers’ and employers’ contributions was unviable. With the changes in the 
government at the end of the decade a new technocratic stage was initiated. The 
change of Labour Minister (Girón was replaced by Fermín Sanz Orrio) sparked off a 
reorganisation of the National Welfare Institute and the preparation of a National 
Social Security Plan in the 1960s.69 
 
                                                 
68 Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi, Así se hizo Mapfre. Mi tiempo (Madrid: Actas Editorial, 2001), 
235. 
69 For more on the period of change during which the new law was prepared, see M. Esther Martínez 
Quinteiro, ‘El INP entre 1957-1978: de los seguros sociales a la seguridad social franquista’, in 
Castillo, Solidaridad, 265-88.  
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Conclusions 
Two main conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of the introduction and 
economic management of compulsory sickness insurance in Spain. First, the 
implementation of sickness insurance after the Civil War served as one more 
propaganda tool for the dictatorship in order to control workers, win over the masses 
and legitimise its power in a context of economic crisis and repression.70 In this 
context, the level of coverage of the population and provisions offered remained low. 
Second, sickness insurance, based on funding through workers’ and employers’ 
contributions and under mixed management in the hands of the National Fund and 
the collaborating bodies had a substantial deficit after ten years in force. The lack of 
financing by the state, the increase in pharmaceutical costs and medical fees and the 
plans to create large hospitals virtually brought the system to a standstill in the mid-
1950s. In 1945 the plan for health care facilities had set an ambitious goal, aiming to 
build 86 large hospitals throughout Spain in a period of 10 years. However, just one 
year later this target had been reduced to 68. The results were much worse than 
expected. By 1953 only 9 of the 68 hospitals envisaged were operational, and the 
majority of these were relatively small and in areas where the demand for hospital 
beds was less. This investment, along with the increase in medical fees after the 
incorporation of a large number of family doctors and specialists, and the rising 
expense of free medicines, led to the appearance of deficits from 1954 onwards. Part 
of this failure was passed onto the collaborating bodies. In 1955 the system of 
special agreements for these bodies was reformed, bringing in tougher tax measures 
with regard to their management. The underlying problem, however, was that the 
mixed management model was based almost exclusively on financing from workers’ 
                                                 
70 For fuller information on this aspect, read Pons and Vilar, ‘Labour repression’, 245–67. 
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and employers’ contributions. The investment in fixed capital together with the 
increase in current expenditure caused a shortfall in funds and the need for public 
contributions. In the late 1950s a debate was already underway about a reform of the 
system which would lead to the public management of sickness insurance in Spain.  
There was an attempt to solve the serious financial situation by passing the 
Basic Law of Social Security in 1963. The main objective was to introduce a unitary 
and integrated model of social protection, on a pay-as-you-go financial basis, with 
public management and state participation in financing (principles also taken on 
board by the General Social Security Law of 1966). However, these objectives were 
not met, as the old contributory systems remained in place while the lack of periodic 
revaluations and the state’s inadequate financial commitment continued. 
Furthermore, the trend towards the unity of social insurance in terms of management 
and financing did not materialise, as a multitude of overlapping institutions survived. 
Spain had to wait until the end of the dictatorship and the adoption of the democratic 
Constitution (1978) in order to enjoy the benefits of an integrated, rational and 
transparent social security system which included sickness risk coverage.  
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Table 1. Origin of start-up capital of compulsory health insurance  
(in current pesetas) 
 
Insurance Surpluses Loans 
Extinct Retirement Pension 4,385,969.29 1,333,512.65 
Maternity  4,323,204.35 1,314,399.17 
Accidents 8,622,490.08 2,621,586.81 
Family Allowances 143,586,748.42 43,656,198.65 
Old Age Allowance 3,533,418.52 1,074,302.62 
Total 164,451,730.63 50,000,000.00 
 
Source: Boletín de Información del Instituto Nacional de Previsión (BIINP), 1944, IV (6), 991. 
 
 
Table 2. Initial premiums for compulsory health insurance 
(in current pesetas) 
 
Wage type Basic wage 
Premium 
(%) Day Half week Week Month 
I   6 
5.01 
0.30 0.90 1.80   7.60 
II   9 0.45 1.40 2.70 11.30 
III 12 0.60 1.80 3.60 15.10 
IV 15 0.75 2.30 4.60 18.80 
V 20 1.00 3.10 6.10 25.10 
VI 25 1.25 3.80 7.60 31.40 
VII 30 1.50 4.60 9.10 37.60 
 
Source: BIINP, 1944, IV (6), 853.  
 
 
Table 3. Management of compulsory sickness insurance (1945-62) 
(in current pesetas) 
 Member companies Insured Beneficiaries* 
Year DI (%) CB (%) Total DI (%) CB (%) Total DI (%) CB (%) Total 
1945 45 55 279,809 29 71 2,047,627 25 75 5,913,280 
1946 46 54 319,829 25 75 2,543,488 25 75 7,698,059 
1947 48 52 364,277 25 75 2,786,405 25 75 8,319,959 
1948 48 52 373,953 25 75 2,829,471 25 75 8,546,451 
1949 46 54 383,468 25 75 2,767,490 25 75 8,377,863 
1950 46 54 367,674 22 78 3,064,641 25 75 8,200,636 
1951 47 53 369,015 23 77 3,145,194 25 75 8,402,295 
1952 49 51 379,037 24 76 3,297,287 27 73 8,766,544 
1953 52 48 399,365 26 74 3,482,947 28 72 4,945,032 
1954 60 40 408,516 33 67 3,705,553 36 64 5,480,900 
1955 63 37 422,499 36 64 3,885,020 39 61 5,688,470 
1956 63 37 432,877 37 63 4,095,319 40 60 5,943,787 
1957 63 37 450,453 36 64 4,212,200 39 61 6,193,669 
1958 64 36 473,738 37 63 4,354,622 39 61 6,608,933 
1959 65 35 498,648 38 62 4,398,820 41 59 6,980,454 
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1960 64 36 484,145 38 62 4,363,004 41 59 7,180,261 
1961 62 38 403,689 38 62 4,275,850 41 59 6,895,821 
1962 62 38 407,616 40 60 4,488,868 43 57 7,189,276 
 
Note: Data for 31 December of each year. 
*Excluding insured. 
CB: Collaborating Bodies. 
DI: Direct Insurance. 
Source: Anuarios Estadísticos de España 1950, 1955, 1960, 1963; Boletín Información del 
INP 1944-45; Revista española de Seguridad Social 1947-51; INP 1961, Memoria 1961; 
Estudio Estadístico del Seguro de Enfermedad 1954-57, drawn up by Alberto Rull Sabaté 
1959, INGESA Archive Manuscript. 
 
 
 
Table 4. Premiums collected and provisions for Sickness Insurance 1945-1952 
(in current pesetas) 
 Premiums collected for Sickness Insurance Compulsory sickness insurance provisions 
Year National Fund (%) 
Collaborating 
Bodies (%) Total 
Direct 
Insurance (%)
Collaborating 
bodies (%) Total 
1945 28.74 71.25 284,706,228 25.52 74.47 198,687,184 
1946 24.96 75.03 427,581,733 25.67 74.32 344,748,154 
1947 25.11 74.88 643,500,339 25.90 74.09 535,374,038 
1948 25.41 74.58 882,989,416 25.48 74.51 701,484,331 
1949 25.43 74.56 1,054,656,995 22.32 77.67 955,949,855 
1950 22.14 77.85 1,489,355,694 22.72 77.27 1,381,823,393 
1951 22.65 77.34 1,701,447,965 24.02 75.97 1,522,450,606 
1952 24.07 75.92 2,264,712,108 25.52 74.47 198,687,184 
 
Source: Revista Iberoamericana de Seguridad Social (RISS), 1954, 3, 441. 
 
 
Table 5. Direct insurance provisions (total in current pesetas) 
Year 
Economic 
% 
Medical 
% 
Pharmaceutical 
% 
Hospital  
% Total 
1946 10.03 51.75 35.27 2.92 50,714,106 
1947 15.50 41.03 38.42 5.03 88,506,497 
1948 17.29 41.71 35.19 5.79 138,705,290 
1949 18.44 40.01 36.78 4.75 178,760,208 
1950 15.22 38.88 41.07 4.80 213,384,023 
1951 12.34 32.62 50.94 4.08 313,971,258 
1952 12.72 34.67 48.72 3.87 365,794,798 
 
Source: RISS, 1954, 3, 441. 
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Table 6. Provisions by collaborating bodies (total in current pesetas) 
Year 
Economic 
% 
Medical 
% 
Pharmaceutical 
% 
Hospital  
% Total 
1946 10.32 52.91 36.13 0.62 147,973,078 
1947 16.28 42.33 39.89 1.49 256,241,657 
1948 17.55 43.10 36.18 3.15 396,668,748 
1949 18.55 40.27 36.72 4.44 522,724,123 
1950 16.01 39.20 41.45 3.33 742,565,832 
1951 12.30 32.57 51.02 4.10 1,067,852,135 
1952 12.77 34.63 48.70 3.89 1,156,655,808 
 
Source: RISS, 1954, 3, 441. 
 
 
Table 7. Health Care Facilities Plan 1954-1959. 
 
Year 
No. hospital 
beds under 
plan 
No. 
Provisional 
hospital beds  
No. hospital 
stays under 
plan 
No. 
provisional 
hospital stays 
(A) (B) (C) (D) 
1954 2,619 733 364,175 208,104 102.95   81.20 458,476 6.47
1955 5,713 617 646,054 190,176 115.74   94.73 917,351 6.50
1956 8,144 609 1,122,347 153,905 139.33 109.91 1,631,185 7.66
1957 8,952 446 1,306,248 135,575 172.85 133.91 1,979,972 8.96
1958 8,952 453 1,625,518 140,882 184.86 151.24 2,277,498 8.87
 
(A): Average cost of hospital stay under plan (in current pesetas). 
(B): Average cost of stay in provisional hospital (in current pesetas). 
(C): Average number of insured in hospitals under plan.  
(D): Rate of hospitalisation per insured and month. 
Source: Análisis funcional y resultados económicos de las instituciones sanitarias. Fiscal 
year 1958. INP. Document 45. 
 
 
Table 8. Sickness Insurance. Income and Expenditure. Direct Insurance INP. 1954-1957 
(in current pesetas) 
 1954 1955 1956 1957 
Income     
Premiums 633,920,341 758,999,406 508,928,686 1,238,798,946
State Contributions  21,834,761 27,577,841 390,808,142 32,393,137
Contributions other Social Insurances - - 220,372,331 64,282,631
Yields and interest 307,053 894198 562,041 85,538
Other revenue - 1,322,072 - -
From collaborating bodies 26,744,782 4,861,532 - 1,815,510
Total Income 682,806,937 793,655,049 1,120,671,200 1,337,375,762
Expenditure  
Benefits  603,029,146 745,234,342 856,948,007 1,118,001,095
Administration Costs 66,432,234 76,553,408 87,089,811 123,758,368
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Other expenses 5,266,523 5,044,993 5,020,110 5,019,733
To National Health Care Facilities Plan 
Sinking Fund  18,976,774 22,712,203 24,090,274 992,197
To common insurance expenses 15,704,446 18,817,303 19,965,695 717,296
Total transfers 709,409,123 868,362,249 993,113,897 1,248,488,689
Difference -26,602,186 -74,707,200 127,557,303 88,887,073
 
Source: Estudio Estadístico del seguro de Enfermedad, 1954, 1955, 1956 and 1957. 
 
Table 9. Sickness Insurance. Income and Expenditure. Collaborating Bodies, 1954-
1957 (in current peseta) 
 1954 1955 1956 1957 
Income     
Premiums 1,789,065,396 1,832,515,294 1,173,969,397 2,959,416,521
State Contributions 18,544,839 12,801,759 901,606,846 12,850,386
Yields and interest 2,459,413 2,125,408 3,011,206 5,793,353
Other revenue - - - 7,632,649
Total Income 1,810,069,648 1,847,442,461 2,078,587,449 2,985,692,909
Expenditure  
Benefits  1,403,015,962 1,506,090,528 1,631,124,787 2,296,337,758
Administration Costs 226,694,167 217,618,915 242,352,247 345,830,513
To INP Direct Insurance 26,744,782 4,861,532 - 1,815,510
To National Health Care 
Facilities Plan Sinking Fund 53,235,447 50,462,535 59,523,865 22,369,524
To common insurance expenses 44,487,666 43,243,004 51,791,401 6,544,617
Total transfers 1,754,178,024 1,822,276,514 1,984,792,300 2,672,897,922
Difference 55,891,624 25,165,947 93,795,149 312,794,987
 
Source: Estudio Estadístico del Seguro de Enfermedad, 1954, 1955, 1956 and 1957. 
 
 
